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Abstract 
This paper outlines some recent points of debate over the economic impact of skilled 
migration on Australia. It is argued that the national gains from an increase in skilled 
immigration are likely to be small but there are significant effects on income 
distribution. Recent general equilibrium modeling results are used to show that the skill 
based immigration programme is a blunt instrument for targeting particular skills needs 
and may have many potential unintended consequences including the “crowding-out” 
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1 1. Introduction 
There has been a dramatic shift in the composition of immigrant flows to Australia 
over the last two decades. Between 1990-95 Australia halved its intake of permanent 
migrants from 120 thousand per year to around 60 thousand. In something of a “policy 
backflip” the intake then accelerated again up to an annual inflow of 140 thousand 
immigrants in 2006. Significantly nearly all of this expansion, of 80 thousand migrants 
per year, was due to people entering under the skilled migrant category with little 
change in the family reunion category (Productivity Commission 2006). This rapid 
change in migrant selection policies towards skilled visas implies an increase in the 
average skill level of immigrants. In particular, as shown by Birrell et al (2006) there 
has been a dramatic increase in the net inflow of Professionals, particularly building 
and engineering professionals and teachers.  
What are the benefits of this change in composition of migrants toward skilled 
migrants? One potential benefit, cited by Miller (1999), is that the points system may 
have contributed to better labour market outcomes for migrants. More generally, 
however, the points system itself is based on the presumption that it provides a low 
cost source of talent to the Australian economy. The aim of this paper is to provide a 
brief survey of economic perspectives of the costs and benefits of importing skilled 
labour focusing, in particular, on the recent study by the Productivity Commission 
(2006) report and the ensuing debate. 
2. National Benefits from Immigration  
The official explanation for the shift toward skilled visa based migrant inflows is the so 
called skills shortage and expected labour market shortages due to an ageing labour 
force. There is good reason to be cautious about this explanation. As argued by 
Gittens (2006) the notion of a “skills shortage” is difficult to reconcile with the basic 
workings of a market. Excess demand should, in a properly function market, generate 
high wages and attract entry from students and induce substation to alternative 
production methods by firms. If something is preventing labour markets from clearing 
then the appropriate policy response should be toward these barriers. Nor is increased 
immigration an appropriate response to population ageing. In particular Guest and 
  2McDonald (2002) show that changes in immigration policy could have, at best, only a 
very minor impact on the decline in labour force participation rates.  
An alternative view is that the recent resurgence in migration is a response to lobby 
groups that favor immigration, particularly Real Estate, Property Development and 
Construction sectors, (see Birrell and Birrell 1978). According to Betts and 
Gilding (2006) these groups did increase their lobbying activities during the lull in the 
late 1990s, and suggest that the increase in immigration was then a direct response to 
this lobbing.
1  
The nice aspect of this political economy explanation is that, in contrast to the “skill-
shortage” argument, it does square with basic economic theory which suggests that the 
effects of immigration on the redistribution of incomes is quantitatively much more 
important than the overall gains from immigration. To appreciate this point first 
consider the standard economics of immigration. Standard models indicate that 
immigration can, in principle, raise the welfare of both immigrants and natives, (Berry 
and Soligo 1969, Parmenter 1990, Clarke and Ng, 1993). Nevertheless Borjas (1995) 
argues that the stakes are quantitatively small. According to Borjas (1995) the presence 
of these immigrants in the USA (approximately 10% of the USA labour force) reduces 
average wages relatively to what they might be otherwise by a number equal to 1.9 
percent of GDP and raises the returns to capital by 2.0% of GDP. Though these are 
large redistributions the net gain is the difference between these numbers which is 
just 0.1 % of GDP.
2  
Moreover this figure ignores other costs associated with government transfers that 
accrue to immigrants. In addition the fact that the gains will be in the form of increased 
returns to capital, a large fraction of which is owned by foreigners. Taking these factors 
into account, Peters and Verikios (1996) find that the overall gains to Australia from 
                                                 
1 Betts and Gilding (2006) offer evidence of the pro-growth lobby, among which includes the fact that 
from Jan 2001 to Oct 2006 The Australian ran 18 pro-immigration editorials and only one opposed to 
immigration. 
2 It also needs to be recognized that not all labour is the same. Some types of labour may gain and others 
may loose depending on the degree of substitutability between the different types.  See also, for example 
Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994) Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano Peri (2006). 
  3immigration are likely to be negative.
3  Econometric literature in Australia, as 
surveyed by Withers (2003), however tends to suggest that there is little detrimental 
impact of immigrants on the macroeconomic aggregates and in particular there is a 
small positive net contribution to the government budget surplus. In short there is 
evidence each way on the impact. Nevertheless the point still remains that the national 
economic benefits are likely to be small. 
However Borjas’ (1995) simple numerical example also shows that, even at the 
national level, there are large redistributive effects of immigration. In his example the 
presence of immigrants in the USA represented a transfer of 1.9% of GDP from labour 
to capital. This argument is not specific to the USA but a point about relative 
magnitudes. That is the net benefits will always be small relative to the size of the 
transfers. Irrespective of the overall national gains immigration clearly brings about 
large gains to some groups within the economy. This is why the political economy 
argument has so much resonance. 
2. The Welfare Gains from Immigration. 
From the preceding discussion it might be tempting to conclude that immigration has 
no real welfare benefits. This conclusion would be wrong, however, as can be 
ascertained from Hamilton and Whalley (1984). They used a computable general 
equilibrium model to compute the gains to the world economy from removing all 
barriers to migration. They found that removing world barriers to labour mobility 
would more than double world GDP! This is a very large effect and, for example, far 
outweighs the expected gains from global trade liberalization.
4 Similarly Walmsley 
                                                 
3 With respect to tax and foreign ownership issues, Peter and Verikios (1996) find that an annual intake 
of 107 thousand people (the intake for 1991-92) creates a Berry Soligo triangle worth 0.006 percent of 
GDP for Australia.
3 After allowing for foreign owned capital stock, however, this changed into a loss 
equal to 1.4% of GDP to native residents. Thus taking policy as given it appears that the Beryy-Soligo 
welfare gains are not only small, but dwarfed by other considerations. Clarke and Ng (1993), however, 
argue that tax and foreign ownership factors are both under the control of natives and could, in principle, 
be adjusted to maximize gains from immigration.  
4 Trade liberalization will also reduce differences in wages between countries, but it will only equalize 
them if each countries has identical technologies. 
  4and Winters (2005) consider the effects of reducing restrictions on temporary 
migration between countries. They find that an increase in developed economies’ 
quotas on inward movements of labour of just 3% of their labour force would raise 
world GDP by 0.6%. This figure is 1.5 times more than the estimated gains expected 
from World trade liberalization.  
Clearly these figures are much larger than the Borjas’s (1995) estimates. The 
difference is that the Hamilton and Whalley (1984) and Walmsley and Winters (2005) 
estimates include the gains to the migrants themselves from the higher wages they 
receive in their adopted countries. The Borjas (1995) figure of 0.1% includes only the 
gains to host country residents.   
Thus I have argued that: (i) the welfare gains from migration are indeed large but; (ii) 
the host country national gains are unlikely to be large and, and hence; (iii) the main 
gains from migration accrue to the migrants themselves. From an ethical perspective 
then, immigration is a very important economic policy. It would seem to be ethically 
desirable to allow unskilled immigrants as this contributes significantly to the incomes 
of those immigrants, and may also be o some small net benefit to Australia. The same 
does not apply for skilled immigrants however due to the standard “brain drain” 
arguments. That is, if education is subsidized, taking skilled immigrants imposes a 
financial burden on the source country which will generally be much poorer countries 
than Australia.
5 The question remains however whether, by focusing on skilled 
immigrants only, the economic gains may be more substantial. 
3. The Effects of Increasing the Skilled Migrant Intake 
I have argued above that the notion that immigrants bring large benefits to Australian 
residents is somewhat dubious. Is the case any stronger if we consider skilled 
immigrants? In particular bringing in skilled immigrants might be expected to bring 
labour services the complement existing labour thus raising productivity of capital and 
domestic labour.  
                                                 
5 See also the discussion in Clarke (2006) who argues there is a strong economic case for skilled 
migration but an ethical case against it. Clarke also argues that skilled immigration has a repressing 
effect on inequality which may also be desirable. 
  5This question has been addressed recently by the Productivity Commission (2006) who 
undertook an economic analysis of the consequences expanding the skilled 
immigration level. Specifically they considered the effects of expanding the skilled 
visa intake by a further by 50% over the next 20 years.  
The PC (2006) find that after 20 years there is a small increase in per-capita output of 
about 0.7 percent. Of this increase only 0.27% is attributed to the higher average skill 
levels of the migrants. The remainder comes about largely due to the increased 
working hours per person.
6 A similar study under taken by Econtech (2005) for The 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. They found slightly larger effect 
of 1.1 percent after 20 years. This is much larger than the PC (2006) to be sure, but still 
a small number in absolute terms.  
Thus the quantitative evidence suggests that the national gains from increased 
migration are small for skilled migrants as well. Hence the main point of interest in 
assessing the impact of immigration on the Australian economy should not be on the 
aggregate welfare gains but rather on who gains and who loses.  
The strength of the PC’s (2006) report however is the detailed modeling of occupation 
levels and industries. This allows us to make inferences about the distributive impacts 
at a relatively high level of detail.
7 The detailed results with respect to the impact of 
skilled immigration on occupations and industries have been published by Giesecke 
and Meagher (2006), who undertook some of the background modeling for the PC.  
In their study the PC (2006) found that an expansion of the skilled visa immigration 
intake would have a substantial affect on wage growth of Professionals. As a whole 
they find that the level of wages and salaries after 20 years of a higher skilled visa 
intake would be 10% lower than it would have otherwise been. At a more detailed level 
Giesecke and Meagher (2006) report that the wages and salaries of Natural and 
Physical Science Professionals would be 14 percent lower with the expansion of 
                                                 
6 The PC 2006 estimates do no measure the gains to natives as it includes wages of the immigrants. On 
the other hand it doesn’t include the gains to the immigrants either. Effectively they measure the change 
in welfare of a average Australian household. If the immigrants are poorer than Australia natives on 
average this will tend to reduce this average gain and vice versa.  
7 The PC (2006) however does not report results at a high level of detail. 
  6skilled migration. Likewise, Medical Practitioners are 13 percent lower, Teachers are 
10 percent lower and Nurses are 8.8 percent lower. Broadly the implied fall in the 
return to post graduate degrees is 7 percent  (Giesecke  and Meagher 2006, Cuxson and 
Giesecke 2006).  
Interestingly however with respect to occupations such as Plumbers and Construction 
Tradespersons Giesecke and Meagher (2006) report that in response to a large 
predicted inflow of immigrants there is very little expected change in wages. This is 
because skilled immigration not only brings in more skilled workers but also fuels 
demand in Construction. Thus the report highlights the difficulties in using 
immigration policy to tackle alleged shortages in specific labour markets. 
Interestingly the PC (2006) and Giesecke and Meagher (2006) also found that the 
sector which gains the most from the immigration intake is Construction and in 
particular, within that broad sector, Residential Building, Ceramics, Plaster, Cement all 
experience substantial increases in demand. Indeed their results show that whether 
immigration is biased towards skill migrants or just a mix of skill and family visa, it is 
these same sectors which benefit the most.  
Whether these changes are good or bad is a moot point and depends on whether one 
accepts the skill shortage argument. Irrespective however it identifies fairly clearly the 
groups which are most threatened by increases in skilled immigration.
8 Moreover, 
having identified these groups the results give credence to the Birrell and Birrell (1978) 
hypothesis that it is in the interests of the Property and Construction sectors to lobby 
for increased migration.  
4. Long Run Considerations  
The modeling work undertaken by the PC (2006) and Giesecke and Meagher (2006) 
considers a time horizon of 20 years and the dynamic impact allowing for capital 
accumulation. The emphasis on dynamics mainly results from the PC’s underlying 
objective of modeling a realistic policy experiment. They wish to consider the effects 
                                                 
8 These results reflects both the assumed composition of the qualifications of immigrants under the 
points system and also the relatively specialized skills of these groups that leave them with limited 
alternatives for substituting into other occupations. 
  7of a substantial change in the skilled migration intake, and choose a ballpark figure of a 
50% increase. Clearly such an increase could not be achieved in a year or even 5 years. 
Hence they consider a gradual increase in the intake over 20 years. On the one hand 
this gives the policy experiment some realism in terms of the way any policy change 
might realistically impact. On the other hand it draws attention to long run dynamic 
effects which are inherently very uncertain.  
Econtech (2006) criticized the PC (2006) for their assumptions regarding the speed on 
transition, which they argued was two slow. This concerns the extent which investors 
respond to changes in the rental rate on capital. If the transition speed is faster, as 
Econtech (2006) argue, this tends to raise the long term economic gains to migration 
significantly as more capital accumulates over a given finite horizon.  
Unfortunately however there is little evidence to support either fast or slow transitions 
and a weak case can be model for both. Macroeconomic models routinely encounter 
this problem with the calibration of adjustment costs parameters, for which there exist 
no reliable empirical estimates. The point then is that while it realistic to consider a 20 
year horizon in an experiment which considers a 50 percent increase in skilled 
migrants, this time horizon also amplifies the uncertainly over which we can safely say 
anything meaningful.  
This long run uncertainty includes also the effects of urban congestion and related 
negative environmental costs, the effects of economies of scale; emigration, and 
possible impacts on the global supply of skilled workers. Again these issues have 
dynamic impacts which have very little empirical knowledge. These are all effects 
which are impacts are likely to be felt in the longer term, and hence, serve to increase 
the uncertainly of long run impacts.  
5. The Biggest Loser. More Long Run Implications 
Adding to this long run uncertainty is another potential cost of immigration that was 
not considered either by Econtech (2006) or the PC (2006). The Marshallian definition 
of the long run is that all factors are variable – including human capital. Over a 20 year 
policy horizon it is reasonable to expect that potential students will respond to changes 
in expected wages by altering their education plans. For example an expected reduction 
  8in salaries of Medical Practitioners by 13% might reasonably be expected to reduce 
the demand for medical degrees.  
Indeed standard growth theory suggests that an increase in supply of skilled workers 
from immigration would initially raise the ratio of skilled to less skilled works S/U. 
Consequently however there will be a transition whereby the ratio of S/U tends to 
decline over time. In a long run (steady state) equilibrium it would fall back the 
original steady state level. Thus Shea and Woodfield (1996) consider a model of long 
run optimal responses to immigration policy and find that skilled immigration reduces 
investment in education.  Shea and Woodfield (1996) thus also find that because less 
people become educated this raises the supply of unskilled labour and hence tends to 
reduce wages of unskilled workers, not skilled workers. In short they find that the 
effects are almost the opposite of those found by the preceding studies where the 
supply of domestic skilled labour was held fixed.
9  
These findings moreover are replicated in much of the “Brain Drain” literature, such as 
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) and McCulloch and Yellen (1977), which finds that 
outflows of skilled workers induce an increase in demand for education in the source 
country.
10 Essentially the source country is providing education for its own economy 
as well as the migrant destination countries.
11 Reversing the logic for the recipient 
country essentially gives us the Shea and Woodfield (1996) result. 
Likewise Harris and Robertson (2007) have recently used a dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model, which features endogenous skilled labour formation 
decisions, to evaluate the impact of the increase in skilled migration. They also find 
                                                 
9 Though it must be noted that in the PC (2006) and the Giesecke and Meagher (2006), domestic labour 
was able to substitute between occupations. Allowing high levels of substitution would be one way of 
incorporating endogenous responses of education decisions to changes in wage incomes.  The possibility 
of crowding out was clearly discussed by the PC during the course of their investigation and is 
mentioned briefly in PC (2006),  but given little importance presumably because the lack of any 
empirical evidence.   
10 See also Commander and Winters (2007) who survey recent brain drain models. 
11 Robertson (2002) considers a version of the Lucas growth model with  both skilled and unskilled 
workers In that model also, an unanticipated increase in human capital results in an immediate fall in 
labour time allocated to human capital formation along a transition path.  
  9that an increase in skilled immigration “crowds out” domestic education. Moreover, 
they find that this effect holds not only in the long run, but in the short run as well. 
Thus a policy announcement that generates expectations of immigrants arriving in the 
future causes students to enter the labour force rather than undertake training. 
According to their estimates, a permanent increase of 20 thousand immigrants per year 
(which accords roughly with the increase in migrants between 1999-2005 whose stated 
occupations was Professionals) results in a 12% fall in student enrollments in higher 
education and hence a 12% fall in the output of the Higher Education sector.
12
These considerations then potentially reverse the earlier conclusions about the 
distributive effects of skilled migration. With a fixed supply of skilled labour the 
burden of adjustment falls upon the wages and salaries of skilled workers. Recognizing 
that incoming workers can substitute away from professions that are in excess supply 
however changes this story. In this case existing skilled workers need not experience 
slower wages and salary growth to accommodate the increased supply of migrants. 
Rather the burden of adjustment falls mainly on the education sector.  
This is not necessarily a bad thing for the Australian economy. Education is expensive 
and skilled immigration allows us to achieve the same level of skills in the economy at 
lower costs. Nevertheless it may be bad for the Australian higher education sector and 
reflects a potentially unforeseen distributional impact of the current skilled visa based 
immigration policy.
 
Finally it should be noted tat there is no empirical evidence that I am aware of that 
indicates that skilled immigration does crowd out domestic education. This lack of 
evidence however is due to the fact that few people ever seem to have seriously 
considered this theory seriously. This would appear to be an important empirical issue 
waiting to be explored.
 13
                                                 
12 In their modeling of skilled immigration the PC (2006) finds that the education sector expands more or 
less in line with the rest of the economy, increasing by 3.9%. 
13 The possibility of crowding out of the domestic education sector  has been acknowledged by Chapman 
and Withers (2002) and Corden (2003). Neither study however give it much credence. A rare empirical 
study is Baker and Wooden (1992). They investigate, but dismiss, the proposition that immigration acts 
as a deterrent to employer sponsored training programmes or domestic workers in Australia.  
  106. Conclusion  
I began this discussion by drawing attention to the recent switch in immigration policy 
which has seen Australian immigrant flows switch from being primarily family reunion 
based to primarily skill based. I then questioned the wisdom of this change in policy if 
the aim is, as stated, to alleviate a “skills shortage.” This skepticism is based on three 
main observations. First the simple economics of immigration suggest that immigration 
has little overall national benefit. Second immigration is a blunt policy instrument and 
may have unintended consequences. As shown by the PC (2006) study, increasing 
immigration has demand effects as well as labour supply effects and the former may 
serve to exacerbate any short term skills shortage. Third increasing skilled immigration 
is likely to consequences on the domestic supply of labour and the education sector.  
The concern here again is that this crowding out of higher education may be an 
unintended consequence of an ill conceived policy to raise skill levels. 
This is not to say that zero skilled immigration is desirable either. As argued by 
Birrell (2001) current flows of skilled migration largely serve to offset the outflow of 
skilled labour. Moreover within in particular occupations and at particular times in 
history there are also likely to be important knowledge spillovers associated with 
immigration. There is also an important ethical case for allowing immigration, 
especially with respect to refugees. Nevertheless for any given economic problem there 
is some first best policy response. As long as we have a well functioning education 
sector it is not clear that opening the gates to skilled migrants, and closing them to 
others, is sensible economic policy.  
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